In recent years a growing number of Western governments have been attracted by proposals to link workers' remuneration more closely to their company ' s performance. Martin Weitzman [1] and James Meade [2] and others argue that the "fixed wage system" helps to create both excessive unemployment and excessive fluctuations in economic activity. They conclude that macroeconomic performance would be improved by the encouragement of payment systems where part of employee compensation is linked to the performance of the firm, thereby improving worker productivity and the firm's competitiveness.
There are a number of ways to have workers' remuneration linked more readily with firms' commercial performance. One is to link wages to profits by using cashbased profit sharing (where workers are made cash payments which vary with employer ' s profitability). A second is to have workers paid partly in their firms' own shares. A third, and more extreme alternative, is producer co-operatives where workers participate in profits, ownership and decision-making. Such sharing schemes involve workers accepting a degee of market risk; the more successful the organisation, the higher are the payments employees will receive. We will not be concerned here with individual incentive schemes such as payment-byresults and commission which do not directly involve market risk, but are determined more directly by the performance of the worker.
In this article we examine both the theoretical and empirical evidence in support of such schemes. We concentrate upon the evidence for Great Britain. Section 1 presents a series of new estimates of the extent of profit . sharing in Great Britain. Section 2 surveys the empirical evidence. It describes tests done -by myself and others -of the various theories. It also presents new evidence on the attitudes of individuals in receipt of various types of profit shares. Section 3 contains the conclusions.
Coverage of Profit Sharing in Great Britain
In this section we examine the evidence that exists on the degree of coverage of three broad forms of sharing schemes in Great Britain. One is profit sharing, under which an employee receives a payment which depends upon the size of the employer's profits. (In some cases payments may be linked to value-added, productivity or revenue.) The second is employee share ownership, under which workers receive, or have an option to purchase cheaply, the shares in the employing company. In some cases firms make profit sharing payments in the form of shares which cannot immediately be sold. Third, we look at annual bonus payments.
Various governments in Great Britain have tried to encourage share ownership and profit sharing, by providing a series of tax breaks*. Currently tax relief is available for four types of scheme:
(1) Share schemes introduced in the 1978 Finance Act covering all employees.
(2) Savings related share option schemes for all employees, introduced in the Finance Act of 1980. In addition, during the 1980s, employees in a number of state-run enterprises were given preferential treatment in acquiring shares in their organisations when they were privatised by the Thatcher Government. Examples include (1) whether their organisation had one or more of the following types of scheme: (a) productivity-linked bonus scheme, (b) annual bonus (at organisation's discretion), (c) share ownership or share option scheme, (d) profit sharing.
(2) Whether they had personally received any payments or benefits under the scheme(s) in the preceding twelve months. Are these types of sharing arrangements alternatives to unionism? Table IV suggests that individuals receiving annual bonuses were less likely than average to be (a) employed in large plants or (b) to be a union member than the private sector average. However, those in receipt of productivity-linked bonuses and/or who owned shares in their employing organisations were particularly likely to be in big plants with at least 500 employees, be union members or covered by recognised unions. Presumably this occurs because of the high fixed costs of setting up and operating such programmes. Explaining the incidence of these schemes across individuals is the subject of current work (with Derek Jones)*.
Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Profit Sharing
Research into the effects of income sharing in Great Britain has been primarily in the following six areas:
* For details of these surveys see Daniel and Millward [4] and Millward and Stevens [5] respectively. Blanchflower and Oswald [6] also show that these schemes were not restricted to small numbers of managerial staff. For earlier attempts at explaining the incidence of sharing schemes in organisations see Blanchflower and Oswald [8] and Estrin and Wilson [9] for Great Britain and Jones and Pliskin [10] for Canada.
(1) Employee attitudes to work (2) Employment levels and variability. We survey the somewhat limited evidence in each of these areas in turn. 
Employee Attitudes to Work
Two of the earliest pieces of evidence on the effects of profit sharing were qualitative in nature. In both cases they were commissioned by pressure groups whose prime purpose is to promote income sharing. The samples used were small and in each case drawn exclusively from the membership of the relevant organisations. Although the results from these studies are of interest, clearly they need to be treated with some caution.
The Industrial Participation Association [11] found that "profit sharing does significantly improve employee attitudes and employee views of the company". They interviewed 2,703 individuals in 12 companies and found that 51 per cent of their respondents reported that they agreed, or strongly agreed, that profit sharing makes people try to work more effectively so as to help the firm be more successful.
The Wider Share Ownership Council [12] surveyed company attitudes towards employee share ownership schemes. Some 138 companies were asked what effect they believed profit sharing or share schemes had on employee attitudes. Three quarters of firms reported that such schemes had a significant effect. This compares with 40 per cent and 20 per cent respectively in the case of savings related schemes. Evidence regarding the effects of these two types of schemes upon productivity, staff turnover, recruitment and employee attitudes was much less clear-cut.
Estrin and Wilson[9,p.13] using a panel of 52 firms in the engineering and metal working sectors over 1978-82, found evidence in their sample that "profit sharing is widely regarded as an employee incentive scheme, likely to increase labour commitment and reduce anti-management attitudes". They also found that the number of working days lost, per employee in their profit-sharing group, on average was 22 compared with 10 for the non-sharers.
In every year of their survey the quit rate was also lower in the former group than in the latter.
Although respondents in the 1985 and 1987 British Social Attitudes Surveys were not asked explicitly about their attitudes towards profit sharing, they did give their views on the state of industrial relations at their workplace plus their expectations on the change in their wage and employment at their workplace over the succeeding year. Such qualitative evidence as does exist seems to suggest that income sharing schemes have little effect upon employees' attitudes to work. It is probable that these results are largely explained by uncontrolled differences in product demands, workplace characteristics such as workplace size, type of product etc. If this evidence is to be believed we would expect to observe some performance enhancing effects of profit sharing which, in principle, should be measurable. As we outline in the following subsections, there is little, if any, unequivocal evidence of a positive quantitative impact of income sharing (however defined) on any of the remaining variables to be examined. It should be pointed out at this stage, however, that very little information is available in these studies on the size of the "sharing" payments being considered. Such evidence as we have available suggests that these payments rarely constitute more than 5 per cent of total remuneration.
Employment
The available evidence on the employment effects of income sharing is inconclusive. Blanchflower and 0swald [3] used nationally representative survey data on 637 manufacturing establishments from the 1980 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS1), in an attempt to determine whether or not the existence of share ownership schemes had beneficial effects upon employment. We could find no statistically significant evidence that the existence of such schemes affected firms' decisions about the number of jobs. This was true whatever the age of the scheme or the proportion of individuals who participated.
A recent case study by Bradley and Estrin [13] investigated the effects of profit sharing on the level of employment between 1970 and 1985 in a large retail store, the John Lewis Partnership. In this firm the profit share varied between 13 per cent and 24 per cent of workers' income. They found that employment exceeded employment at each of four competitors by 20-30 per cent after controlling for remuneration, sales and retail sales. However, profit sharing did not have any significant influence on the rate of change of employment. In contrast, Estrin and Wilson [9] examined the employment effects of profit sharing (defined as cash profit sharing or value-added bonuses) in their panel of 52 firms in UK metalworking. They found that profit sharing had no significant effect upon the level of employment, although it had a small effect on the rate of change of employment.
Jones and Pliskin [14] examined the employment effects of profit sharing in a panel of British firms in the printing, footwear and clothing industries between 1890 and 1975 (because of missing values the most observations on any single firm was 77). The authors' principal finding was that the employment effect of profit sharing is dependent upon (1) the way in which profit sharing is measured (2) whether or not measures of employee participation in decision making were included in the employment equation. When such a measure was included they found that for a typical profit-sharing firm, employment effects were unstable, and ranged from -8 per cent to 4 per cent.
Investment
Weitzman [15] has argued that investment might be higher in a share economy, primarily because output would be stabilised near full-capacity. In addition, Grout [16] has studied the economics of employee share ownership. His model predicts that when there are tax incentives to employee share ownership, firms with share schemes will invest more than those without. In the only test of these hypotheses currently available for Great Britain, Blanchflower and Oswald [3] found that the presence of employee share ownership schemes in 1980 had had no statistically significant effect upon an establishment's investment behaviour over the preceding two to three years.
Profitability
Blanchflower and Oswald [6] used the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS2) to study how the financial performance of workplaces was related to the three types of sharing identified in Table I -share ownership, profit sharing and value-added bonuses. It was found that none of the variables, either individually or when interacted together, significantly influenced the probability of an establishment having "above average performance". The major influences on this probability were:
(1) The size of the establishment. Richardson and Nejad [17] analysed the impact of financial participation schemes on share price movements over the period 1978-1984 using a sample of 41 firms chosen from the UK multiple store sector. This sector was chosen because it was reasonably competitive, relatively free from foreign competition and unlikely to have its profit levels affected by the vagaries of the exchange rate. By the end of 1984, out of their sample of 41 firms, 23 were operating at least one employee share ownership scheme. Their main finding was that companies which introduced the schemes had a 5 per cent higher share appreciation than those that did not. This difference was statistically significant at only the 10 per cent level. It is questionable that one can infer from these results that share ownership schemes raise share prices. It is perfectly possible, for example, that share ownership might be an index of a high quality management and higher (uncontrolled) lagged profits. Firms that earn profits are the ones that (a) will survive (b) establish employee share ownership schemes (c) distribute share payments. Such differences need to be controlled for in any empirical analysis of the influence of profit sharing on firm performance.
Remuneration
A number of studies have estimated wage equations which include one or more profit sharing variables. Examples include Blanchflower and Oswald [18] on individuals, Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett [7] on establishments and Estrin and Wilson [9] on firms. In none of these studies did the coefficient on any of the income sharing variables ever achieve significance.
Produdivity
The work in this area has involved estimating production functions augmented by variables measuring various forms of participation*. Estrin, Jones and Svejnar [19] estimated production functions for 50 producer cooperatives in the United Kingdom in three industries between 1948 and 1968. They found that profit sharing (measured by the average surplus distributed per worker) had a positive effect upon productivity.
Profit sharing had a positive, but statistically insignificant impact on productivity Jones[20] studied the productivity effects of profit sharing in a sample of 50 British retail cooperatives in 1978. Profit sharing (measured by the dividend distributed per member) had a positive, but statistically insignificant impact on productivity.
Finally, in an interesting recent article Cable and Wilson [21] examined the extent to which profit sharing influenced productivity in a sample of 52 firms in the UK engineering industry from 19784982**. Their main finding was that firms operating profit sharing had productivity differentials * This section draws heavily on Jones and Pliskin[141. ** The same sample of firms was used in the Estrin and Wilson study discussed above.
of between 3 per cent and 8 per cent compared to firms without such schemes. These estimates came from models in which profit sharing was interacted with factor input levels and the firm's technological, organisational and labour-force characteristics. The authors argue that:
" Contrary to what might be inferred from previous work indicating disembodied shift-effects, the introduction of profit sharing ceteris paribus will not necessarily have productivity enhancing effects; accompanying changes in other dimensions of organisational design are likely to be required" (p.373).
This work is clearly of some importance. However, as the authors themselves note, productivity gains could be associated with higher quality of management. The paper does suggest the need to allow for more complex specification of the profit sharing variable(s) than has been used in most of the existing work surveyed here.
Conclusions
In many respects Great Britain is already a "sharing economy " . By 1987 over 50 per cent of private sector organisations and 41 per cent of private sector individuals received some form of income sharing. Government encouragement of profit sharing through tax incentives and other means has resulted in a substantial growth of such schemes in the 1980s.
We have found absolutely no evidence that profit sharing does any harm
There is little strong evidence for Great Britain that the presence of profit sharing significantly improves employment, profitability, productivity, investment or remuneration. However, the average payment under these schemes is small, amounting to less than 5 per cent of an employee's total remuneration. Given the small scale of these payments it seems unlikely that they would generate many very large effects.
We have found absolutely no evidence that profit sharing does any harm. For countries faced with severe economic problems it may be worthwhile experimenting with it, particularly if it is possible to influence employee attitudes. The success of the Japanese economy and of UK firms like the John Lewis Partnership is intriguing and may, although this is merely a matter of conjecture, be something to do with their adoption of profit sharing. I personally do not, however, see profit sharing as a great panacea -it is a harmless irrelevance.
